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Abstract 
This paper analyses how self-employed (entrepreneurs) and employed workers earnings differ 
in Spain. We develop an empirical analysis  on the factors that determine income and the factors 
that determine the effects on the financial  situation of the families of entrepreneurs versus 
salaried families. We use the “Encuesta Financiera de las Familias” database corresponding to 
2011. Our results show that salaried workers earn more than the self-employed workers. 
Furthermore, pessimism and familiar patrimony play a key role in the entrepreneur decision.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Entrepreneurship is a common potential labour alternative to salaried employment 
at a global level.  Theoretical and empirical studies of entrepreneurship and self-
employment are common fields in economic literature. In the case of Spain, the country 
studied in this paper, Cueto et al. (2015) find that in some regions unemployment and 
self-employment move in opposite directions; however, in other regions they move in 
the same direction. It is due to the so-called “entrepreneurial spirit” of individuals. If 
this entrepreneurial spirit is strong in a certain region, then people will find self-
employment an attractive alternative to salaried employment and they might use it as 
refuge from unemployment. On the contrary, if the entrepreneurial spirit is not strong in 
a region, increases in unemployment will not be followed by increases in self-
employment. 
 
Following along the same line of research, Congregado, Golpe and Carmona (2010) 
analyse the relationship between unemployment and entrepreneurship and find that 
during economic crises unemployment incentivizes self-employment. Moreover, during 
expansion periods, few successful self-employed workers leave self-employment 
because they cannot find better labour conditions. On the other hand, Congregado, 
Esteve and Golpe (2012) find evidence that, while the level of salaried employment has 
varied substantially during the present economic crisis, the level of self-employment has 
not, this is a different pattern than the one from the 1991-1993 crisis, where the level of 
self-employment was not stable.  
 
Gimenez-Nadal, Molina and Ortega (2012) analyse the relationships between self-
employment and time used in household chores. They show how self-employment 
offers individuals more flexible hours. Thus, mothers can structure their market work 
time and childcare time in a more efficient way. In this familial context, Molina (2015) 
reviews the recent theoretical and empirical contributions to homework, and their 
relation to the equilibrium between family and labour activities. García et al. (2011) 
give international evidence on the differences between genders regarding time devoted 
to work and childcare, and Giménez and Molina (2014) create a labour framework to 
analyse the relationships between time use decisions, gender and labour, and regional 
unemployment rates for Spain. 
 
Carrasco, Albarrán and Martínez-Granado (2009) study inequality between salaried 
and self-employed workers. They show that salaried workers’ wages are significantly 
higher than the earnings of their self-employed counterparts. Besides, Castro and 
Santero (2014) find empirical evidence on the importance of educational level, labour 
stability and experience as gender entrepreneur determinants. At an international level, 
Hamilton (2000) studies earnings differences between private-sector salaried workers 
and self-employed workers. It is shown that the financial profits of salaried workers, 
and their rate of growth, are 35% higher than those of self-employed workers.  
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The present paper has the objective of developing a similar analysis to the one by 
Hamilton (2000), in a microeconomic perspective and for Spain, with current data. 
Moreover, Spain has been strongly affected by the economic crisis and the 
unemployment rate has suffered greatly from its effects. Thus, individuals may have 
incentives to find income from other sources than salaried jobs, i.e., people have 
incentives to become an entrepreneur, in line with what was reported by Congregado, 
Golpe and Carmona (2010) and Cueto et al. (2015). However, it is possible that the 
expectations of those considering self-employment, a job without supervision, without a 
boss, without rigid schedules, will be truncated by the reality of a crisis-affected labour 
market in the sense that the expected earnings cannot be obtained unless entrepreneurs 
devote not only high temporal and capital investments or managerial inputs, but also use 
other concepts such as innovation. We cannot forget the effect of other types of 
variables: laws, taxes and others that are derived from the former, including evasion and 
fraud; although, data about tax variables is not included. In this context, Molina and 
Montuenga (2009) provide evidence specific to Spain regarding the significant salaried 
penalization for maternity as a consequence of not only economic situation there, but 
also the legal situation.  
 
We use the theoretical framework of Blau (1985) and Taiwo (2010) as benchmark,  
which states that self-employment outcomes are characterized by a production function 
whose inputs are capital investment, time devoted and individual managerial abilities. 
We regard technical abilities as being important as well. Individual managerial abilities 
refers to the capability of successfully running  a business, which will be taken into 
account as labour experience, while technical abilities involve technical knowledge, i.e. 
the individual’s  level of education. Empirical evidence on the importance of these 
factors for European countries can be found in García et al. (2010). This paper proposes 
an adaptation of the theoretical model created by Blau (1985) for self-employment in a 
household á la Chiappori background, which can be solved according to the second 
theorem of welfare economics.  Using the micro-data collected in the “Encuesta 
Financiera de las Familias” (EFF)  from 2011, we propose an empirical model  for 
analysing factors that are supposed to affect earnings for both employed and self-
employed workers (entrepreneurs), and we also analyse the differences between both 
groups of workers in Spain. Furthermore, we will analyse how the household financial 
situation is related to the  decision to become an entrepreneur, i.e., being self-employed 
versus being an employed worker.  
 
Our data, collected in the Bank of Spain’s 2011 EFF, are a cross-section, and our 
empirical modelling has been conditioned to this fact. On the one hand, we use  a linear 
OLS estimation model to analyse the factors that explain earnings for the employed and 
the self-employed workers. On the other hand, we will use binary Maximum Likelihood 
estimation regression models, both Logit and Probit, to analyse the effect of the 
household financial situation on  entrepreneurs. Inherit consequences of cross-sectional 
analyses are unobserved heterogeneity and double causality, we will show that the 
former will play an important role in the self-employment outcomes models, where non-
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controllable factors (according to our database) may strongly affect self-employed 
earnings, in contrast to employed wages. The latter restriction is unavoidable due to the 
lack of a temporal trend in our data, and thus we cannot talk about directions of the 
relationships found. 
 
Our empirical results show how salaried workers’ wages are higher than self-
employed workers and entrepreneurs’ earnings. Furthermore, factors that traditionally 
determine wages in a significant way do not have the same effect in the case of self-
employment outcomes. We also find that debts do not have impact on entrepreneurs; 
however, pessimism derived from unemployment does, discouraging entrepreneurship. 
Household assets (vehicles, estate and stocks) and the financial security that they 
provide also affect entrepreneurship, by encouraging people to become entrepreneurs. A 
need for income derived from high average household expenses affects 
entrepreneurship in a negative way.  
 
Our contribution to the literature on self-employment is threshold. We first pose a 
theoretical model of self-employment household, based on a utility maximization in à la 
Chiappori background where not only time devoted to work and time invested are 
considered as self-employment outcomes determinants, but also the technical and 
managerial abilities of the individuals. Second, we use financial microeconomic data to 
analyse self-employment, which is not common in this field. Data derived from the 
Spanish EFF from the year 2011 provides us with information to study the effects of the 
financial situation of families with income coming from entrepreneurship and self-
employment, which leads us to distinguish between self-employed and salaried families. 
Our data also lets us to differentiate between entrepreneurs and self-employed 
individuals, a difficult issue due to their conceptual similarities 1.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We propose the theoretical model in 
section 2. Section 3 presents our data and variables while section 4 details our 
microeconometric analysis. Finally, we present the conclusions of our study in section 
5.  
 
 
2. Household approach to the Blau (1985) model  
 
Household approach microeconomic theoretical models of utility maximization have 
known advantages  when compared to a unitary approach. This kind of modelling was 
created in the work of Nobel Prize winner (1992) Gary Becker. He studied the 
efficiency improvements in household formation derived from cohabitation. Our new 
household approach takes  Blau (1985) and Taiwo (2010) unitary models as 
                       
1 We must propose an alternative definition of entrepreneur than the one of given by the GEM. We define 
entrepreneurs as those self-employed individuals whose business has been active for up to eight years in 
order to have a big enough sample. 
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benchmarks. We are going to propose an analogous perspective to the one used by P.A. 
Chiappori, who named this kind of household model. Household models à la Chiappori 
are themselves an important current field of research in microeconomics (Chiappori, 
1992; Bargain and Donni, 2011; Donni and Matteazzi, 2010 or Cherchye, De Rock and 
Vermeulen, 2010) 
 
In the Blau (1985) model, individuals maximize their utility function (whose inputs 
are leisure and consumption) individually, subjected to both budgetary and temporal 
restrictions. As we have mentioned above, self-employment outcomes are characterized 
by an income-production function with capital, temporal and managerial inputs. 
Individuals can control the time devoted to self-employment and capital investment, but 
not personal abilities, which are fixed for each individual.  
 
When jumping to a household approach, we suppose that households are formed by 
two individuals i=1,2, i.e., our households will be couples. The difference is that it is the 
household itself, and not the individuals, who maximize utility. Thus, we can write the 
maximization utility function as follows: 
 
ߤ ൈ ଵܷሺࡳଵ, ଵܵሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߤሻ ൈ ܷଶሺࡳଶ, ܵଶሻ, 
 
where ௜ܷሺࡳ௜, ௜ܵሻ is utility of i, in function of consumption, ࡳ௜ , and leisure time, ௜ܵ . 
Parameter ߤ ≡ ߤሺݓ௜ ൅ ܳ௜, ݀ሻ  defines the household bargaining power of ݅ ൌ 1  (so 
1 െ ߤ is the one of individual ݅ ൌ 2) as a function of individual earnings, ݓ௜ ൅ ܳ௜, and 
socio-demographic characteristics, d. We define ݓ௜  as private-sector wage and ܳ௜  as 
self-employment earnings of individual ݅. 
 
Let E be total household worth and T be total disposable time (which must be 
divided between leisure, salaried work, Hi, and self-employment, ௜ܰ). We take ݓ௜  as 
exogenous. Now, we characterize self-employment as Blau (1985) and Taiwo (2010) 
did, but add technical abilities to the production function inputs. Let this function be 
ܳ௜ ≡ ܳ௜ሺܭ௜, ௜ܰ , ܯ௜ሻ  where ܳ௜  is output, ܭ௜  is capital invest and ܯ௜  reflects personal 
(managerial and technical) abilities. ܳ௜  follows the common productivity function 
hypothesis. Then, temporal and budgetary constraints can be respectively written as: 
 
ܪ௜ ൅ ௜ܰ ൅ ௜ܵ ൌ ܶ, ݅ ൌ 1,2 
 
ܩଵ ൅ ܩଶ ൅ ܭଵ ൅ ܭଶ ൌ ܧ ൅ ݓሺܪଵ ൅ ܪଶሻ ൅ ܳଵ ൅ ܳଶ 
 
Note that there is a temporal restriction for each individual because there is no 
conceptual or analytical reasoning behind defining a household temporal restriction. 
However, there is a unique budgetary constraint that depends not only on individual 
earnings and working times, but also on household income. 
 
In this background, individuals have control over H, N and K (note that as far as T 
is fixed, by controlling H and N, S=T–H–N is immediately determined). Thus, the 
maximization problem can be solved by using the second theorem of welfare 
economics. According to this theorem, the problem is analogous to a two-step process. 
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In the first step an intra-familiar negotiation process is carried out and individuals arrive 
at an agreement regarding household income distribution: ܧ ൌ ܧଵ ൅ ܧଶ. In the second 
step, individuals maximize their utilities independently, under a traditional temporal 
constraint and a new budgetary constraint that depends upon the negotiation process of 
the previous step:  
 
																												For	݅ ൌ 1,2,								Max: 						 ௜ܷ ൌ ௜ܷሺܩ௜, ௜ܵሻ 
 
Subject	to:							ܪ௜ ൅ ௜ܵ ൌ ܶ																	 
 
																																					ܩ௜ ൅ ܭ௜ ൌ 	ܧ௜ ൅ ݓܪ௜ ൅ ܳ௜ 
 
 
 
3. Data and variables 
 
The Bank of Spain’s “Encuesta Financiera de las Familias” (EFF), is a survey of the 
“Plan Estadístico Nacional”. It has been developed every three years, since 2002, for 
individuals of each socio-economic stratum in order to obtain  a complete 
representation. Its objective is to offer direct information about the economic and 
financial situations of Spanish families. Such information complements aggregated data 
collected in the financial accounts (“Cuentas Financieras”) of the Spanish economy. 
More information can be found in 
http://www.bde.es/bde/es/areas/estadis/Otras_estadistic/Encuesta_Financi/. We will use 
cross-sectional data collected in this survey for both the household and the head of 
household for the year 2011. The importance of these data is in its nature. They include 
financial and economic variables, such as wages, earnings, labour contracts, self-
employment outcomes, debts, value of business, value of household worth, mortgages, 
benefits, scholarships, loans, assets…, and also personal social variables such as age, 
education level or nationality. This kind of data has been underused in labour 
economics, particularly in self-employment analyses. We keep the following variables: 
“self-employed” (determines when an individual is self-employed), “self-employed, 
main” (when an individual’s main job is self-employment), “salaried” (when an 
individual is employed in a salaried position), “salaried, main” (when an individual’s 
main job is salaried),  “entrepreneur” (when an individual is an entrepreneur), “wage”, 
“self-employment earnings”, “total earnings” (each is measured in Euros, the latter is 
the sum of the two former), “salaried work time”, “self-employed work time”, “work 
time” (each is measured in hours per week; the latter is measured as the sum of the two 
former),  “household income”, “household expenses” (measured in average Euros per 
month), “home ownership” (when a family owns the home they live in, versus renting 
it), “age”, “age^2/100”, “family size”, “living as a couple”, “good health” (self-reported 
by individuals in EFF), “education level” (we distinguish between basic, secondary and 
university education), “age of business” (for  self-employed workers), “experience, 
private sector” (for  salaried workers), “long-term contract”, “full-time contract” (for 
salaried workers), “mortgages” (aggregating the present value of all outstanding 
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mortgages in the household, measured in Euros), “household vehicles value” 
(aggregating the present value of all household vehicles, measured in Euros), 
“household estate value” (aggregating the present value of all household estates, 
measured in Euros), “other property value” (jewellery, art…), “debts” (aggregating the 
present value of all household debts, except mortgages, measured in Euros) and “assets” 
(aggregating the present value of all household assets, measured in Euros). 
 
Developing a cross-sectional analysis comes with two inherent consequences: 
unobserved heterogeneity and double causality. The former refers to the differences in 
the explained variable that are not explained for in observable variables. We will show 
that this is going to play an important role in the self-employment outcomes models, 
where non-controllable factors (according to the database) may strongly affect self-
employed worker’s earnings, in contrast with the wages of their employed counterparts. 
The latter restriction is unavoidable as far as there is not  a temporal trend in our data, 
which means that we only find relationships between variables, but  not  their causal 
direction. However, cross-sectional analyses derived from surveys are common in 
microeconomics. On the one hand, surveys offer impartial data; on the other hand, panel 
data surveys are very rare.  
 
We eliminate those families whose head of household is retired or unemployed, and 
retain a sample of 2,501 individuals (of whom 1,724 are salaried workers and 842 are 
self-employed workers). A statistical summary of our variables, by gender and by 
labour status, is shown in Table 1. We have defined zero earnings for those individuals 
that are self-employed and do not have any profit from his/her business. It is apparent 
that on average men present higher earnings than women. In fact, this pattern is true for 
both salaried (+1,400€) and self-employed (+600€) families. Moreover, those who are 
employed receive significantly higher earnings than those who are self-employed 
(+2,000€ for men and +1,000€ for women). Regarding time devoted to work, we find 
that, in fact, self-employment is not related to less market work time. On the contrary, 
self-employed men and women devote on average 3 weekly hours more to their jobs 
than their counterparts. Men also devote on average more time to market work than 
women, +6 hours and +5.5 hours every week for employed and self-employed men, 
respectively. This is directly related to the so-called Household-Responsibilities 
Hypothesis. This hypothesis says that women devote more time to childcare and 
household activities. Thus, mothers will devote less time to other activities, such as 
market work. Concerning our new definition of entrepreneurs, we consider that 24% 
(35%) of self-employed men (women) are entrepreneurs. 
 
Let’s note that employed and self-employed individuals do not necessarily have a 
single employment. If we observe the number of individuals in our sample and the 
number of employed and self-employed workers, we find that some of them  must by 
necessity combine both types of labour status. 8.2% (5.6%) of self-employed men 
(women) in our sample are also salaried workers, and 5.3% (1.4%) of the employed 
men (women) also have their own business. Furthermore, only 1% (0.7%) of the 
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salaried men (women) in our sample are entrepreneurs. This can mean that in an 
expansive economic situation, salaried workers may look to increase their earnings 
through entrepreneurship, but not during an economic crisis. For the predictive 
analyses, we will define total earnings and total market work time.  
 
Earnings densities are shown in Figure 1. We can appreciate a strong presence of 
null or almost null declared earnings self-employed individuals (remember that those 
individuals that reported self-employment loss have been coded as zero earnings). 
These individuals are an important part of our analysis (85.6% of the self-employed 
workers from the sample declare zero or negative self-employment earnings and 78.7% 
of the self-employed declare zero or negative total earnings) and we do not consider 
eliminating them an option  due to that they reflect an important part of our sample and, 
thus, the reality of self-employment in Spain. Although salaried workers also present a 
density concentrated around low values, the mean is significantly higher than that of 
self-employed workers, as we mentioned above. 
 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between weekly market work time and earnings for 
self-employed and salaried workers, which shows a notably positive relationship for the 
latter. The reasoning behind this result is clear: the higher the wage, the more time 
workers are able to work, and conversely, the more time worked, the higher the earnings 
received for this work. However, there is no such clear relationship for  self-employed 
individuals. One limitation of these analyses is that we are adjusting with a linear trend 
and there can be no linear relationships. Nevertheless, we cannot affirm that temporal 
input has a key role determining self-employment outcomes according to our sample, in 
Spain.  
 
Figure 3 shows the relationships between total earnings, total time devoted to work 
weekly and educational level, for both salaried and self-employed workers. We can see 
the relationship between a high educational level and the higher earnings in the 
employed workforce, although there is not a clear relationship with market work time. 
Regarding the self-employed workforce, we can see how education and earnings do not 
seem to be related, but the higher the educational level, the lower the market work time. 
Figure 4 shows relationships between experience and earnings. For salaried workers, we 
can take their experience directly from the EFF; for self-employed individuals, we 
approximate it based on the age of their business. Although it seems that earnings 
increase slightly with experience for salaried workers, we cannot conclude that there is 
a positive relationship for either those who are employed or for those self-employed. 
Thus, we do not find clear evidence, in the case of Spain, on the importance of technical 
and managerial abilities as inputs for the self-employment production function. 
Moreover, the temporal input seems to not have a determinant role either.  
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4. Econometric analysis 
 
4.1 Empirical strategy 
 
We propose two empirical models, one for the earnings analysis and another for the 
study of the household financial situation and entrepreneurs. The former, which we 
decide to call “earning model”, is proposed as a linear regression model whose 
parameters will be estimated by Ordinary Least Squares, OLS. We regress earnings for 
salaried workers, self-employed workers and entrepreneurs from a series of variables. 
These variables are work-related variables (experience, market work time and type of 
contract, for salaried workers), educational variables, household variables (living as a 
couple, family size, ownership of the home, monthly expenses and debts), personal 
variables (age, gender and health) and labour status variables (we want to compare self-
employed workers and entrepreneurs with salaried workers), as is shown in Table 2. 
Estimates of these parameters will be interpreted as the average variation of earnings 
between individuals, according to their labour status (e.g., for salaried workers, the self-
employed parameter reflects the earnings differences, not measured by the rest of the 
variables, between an individual who only works in a salaried position and an individual 
who also is self-employed). We also include age squared to measure the presence of 
non-linear relationships.  
 
We have noted above the strong presence of individuals with null earnings. 
Therefore, the use of linear regression models is preferable to censored regression 
models, such as the Tobit Model. However, the use of OLS linear models is justified 
and common in microeconometric literature (Gimenez-Nadal and Molina, 2015a, 
2015b; Frazis and Stewart, 2012; Foster and Kalenkoski, 2013).  
 
The second model we propose refers to the household financial situation, and we 
have called it “self-employment model”. We intend to show the relationships between 
some financial variables, such as value of assets, household properties or debts, and 
being self-employed or salaried. Thus, we could conclude that the factors that are 
positively related to self-employment are factors that favour or are favoured by 
entrepreneurs. In doing so, we pose two binary models, Logit and Probit. Since both 
models behave similarly, we expect that they will offer robust estimates compared with 
the other in the sense that meaningfulness and sign of coefficients do not vary from one 
to another. The dependent variable of these models is thus the dummy variable “self-
employed”, because we want to compare the financial situation of salaried and self-
employed families. We include not only financial variables in the model (mortgages, 
vehicle value, estate value, other property value, debts and assets), but also personal 
(gender, age, age squared and health), household (expenses, living as a couple and 
family size), labour (time worked, experience and being unemployed in 2010) and 
education (using basic education level) variables. We use the weights collected in the 
EFF for both the Earnings and the Self-employment model.  
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We can write the earnings models as follows: 
 
௜ܹ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܵܧ௜ ൅ ࢼ૛ࢄ࢏ ൅ ߝ௜, 
 
௜ܹ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܣ ௜ܵ ൅ ࢻ૛ࢅ࢏ ൅ ߳௜, 
 
where W is the earnings of salaried and self-employed workers (entrepreneurs), 
respectively, SE is the dummy “self-employed”, AS is the dummy “salaried”, X and Y 
are the rest of dependent variables for the salaried and the self-employed workers, 
respectively, and ߝ and ߳ are standard robust error terms. We expect to find that ߚଵ ൏ 0 
and ߙଵ ൐ 0  are both meaningful, according to the idea that salaried workers earn more 
than self-employed individuals. We also expect to find that the relationship  is the same 
for entrepreneurs. 
 
On the other hand, self-employed binary models can be written as: 
 
ܵܧ௜ ൌ ߜ଴ ൅ ߜଵࢆ૚࢏ ൅ ߜଶࢆ૛࢏ ൅ ߜଷࢆ૜࢏ ൅ ݑ௜, 
 
where ࢆ૚ are personal, familiar, labour and education variables, ࢆ૛ are debts and ࢆ૜ is 
different property value; u is the standard robust error term. Coefficients have to be 
interpreted as the change in the probability of being self-employed (for salaried 
workers) when the corresponding dependent variable increases by a unit. We expect that 
ࢆ૛ ൏ 0 and ࢆ૜ ൐ 0, i.e., high wellness value will incentivise individuals to become 
entrepreneurs and high debts will discourage them.  
 
 
4.2 Results 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the earnings models. Columns 1 and 3 are restricted to 
individuals who work as salaried or employed workers (not necessarily as a main job). 
Column 2 is restricted to individuals who are self-employed and Column 4 to 
individuals who are entrepreneurs (again, not necessarily as their main job). We can see 
how, for salaried workers, self-employment implies on average a meaningful loss in 
earnings (-656€/month), but not if we restrict the comparison to salaried individuals and 
entrepreneurs. On the other hand, all the self-employed workers, entrepreneurs or not, 
who also work as salaried workers experience on average a meaningful increase in 
earnings (+1295€/month for those who are self-employed and +1080€/month for 
entrepreneurs). 
 
It is also shown that market work time is significantly related to earnings but only 
for salaried workers. The greater the amount of market work time, the higher their 
monthly salaried earnings, and vice versa. For self-employed workers and 
entrepreneurs, this relationship is not meaningful. This could mean that, while salaried 
workers are encouraged to work more time for a higher wage, or that they receive 
higher earnings by working more hours; these patterns are not true for self-employment, 
neither for entrepreneurs, nor for self-employed non-entrepreneurs. Moreover, family 
 11
size has a negative relationship with earnings for salaried workers, but not for self-
employed workers and entrepreneurs.  
 
We find that educational level and experience are not related to self-employment 
outcomes, which surprises us. Thus, we do not find evidence, in this Spanish case study, 
of the importance of the hypothesis Blau (1985) describes about managerial abilities, 
measured as experience. Nor do we find evidence of the importance of technical 
abilities (measured as education level). However, we can conclude with certainty that 
personal, familial and socio-demographic factors that are usually related to earnings are 
also meaningful in the case of Spanish salaried workers, but not for self-employed 
workers or for entrepreneurs. Only monthly expenses show a positive relationship with 
self-employment outcomes, but only for self-employed workers in general, not for 
entrepreneurs. We should now address the previously mentioned  importance of 
unobservable heterogeneity, i.e., factors that data is not available for  (e.g., laws, taxes, 
evasion, differentiation between firm owner, employer or freelance worker, type of 
business, ideas behind business, innovation…). If we look at the ܴଶ of the models, we 
can see how it is higher for Columns 1 and 3, reflecting that models of self-employment 
and entrepreneurship are more poorly adjusted than the ones for the salaried workers. 
Other variables that might affect self-employment are individual expectations and 
entrepreneurial spirit. Dawson et al. (2015) say that pessimism and realism imply 
success for self-employment because they do not raise expectations too high, but 
optimistic entrepreneurs do and then it is more difficult for them to reach those 
expectations. 
 
Table 4 displays the self-employment models’ estimates. Columns 1 and 2 refer to 
Probit models and Columns 3 and 4 to Logit models. We get qualitatively similar 
results for both cases, so results do not depend on the statistical model chosen. 
Furthermore, we have eliminated non-meaningful variables of Columns 1 and 3 in 
Columns 2 and 4. Variables retain their meaning and relationships do not vary. Across 
household, personal and labour variables, we can see how market work time is 
positively related to self-employment, so the more time that is devoted to work, the 
more possibility of becoming self-employed, and/or vice-versa. Age is also, quadratic 
and positively, related to the probability of becoming self-employed. The pattern 
regarding the case of education variables is as follows: if we control for basic education 
level, a secondary education level is positively related with salaried employment. A 
university education level does not have a meaningful relationship with self-
employment or salaried employment. Health, gender, living as a couple and family size 
do not affect the probability of being a self-employed or a salaried worker. Regarding 
financial factors, it is shown that mortgages and debts are not related to the probability 
of becoming self-employed; therefore, they do not affect entrepreneurs. Although, 
having been unemployed during the previous year is negatively related with self-
employment. On the other hand, estate, vehicle and assets value are positively related 
with the probability of being self-employed.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
This paper analyses the differences between salaried and self-employed earnings, 
not only quantitative differences, but also the factors that determine them. We also 
study how household financial situations are related to entrepreneurial activity. To do 
so, we use the Bank of Spain’s “Encuesta Financiera de las Familias”, EFF, from  2011. 
Our main objective is to empirically study self-employment in Spain, and examine the 
idea of it being a potential labour alternative to being an employee, with some 
advantages, such as better schedules.  
 
Our empirical results show that salaried workers get significantly higher earnings 
than their self-employed counterparts. Furthermore, the average work time of self-
employed individuals is also notably higher than that of employed workers. In addition, 
we find evidence of the importance of the usual factors that determine wages, but these 
variables are not related to self-employment outcomes. Moreover, ܴଶ	statistics appear to 
indicate that unobservable heterogeneity, possibly variables related to legal issues or a 
sense of calling, have a strong effect on self-employment income. We also find that 
debts and mortgages are not particularly related to self-employment, in comparison with 
salaried employment, but to have been unemployed discourages entrepreneurship and a 
good household financial situation encourages it. This leads us to conclude that 
entrepreneurship, and therefore self-employment, is not an activity exclusively derived 
from needs, but also from entrepreneurial spirit, desire and innovation.  
 
A strong limitation of our analysis comes from the nature of the data used, as it sets 
a cross-section, we cannot determine causes and effects, we can only find relationships 
between variables. In our case, it is not at all clear what the causal relationships 
involved are. Financial situation may determine  entrepreneurial activity, or maybe 
being self-employed, in comparison to being an employee, is what determines the 
household financial situation. Another limitation is the unobservable component that we 
have mentioned above.  
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Table 1. Descriptive analysis 
 
                               Male                              Female 
Self-employed Salaried  Self-employed Salaried  
Variables Mean E.D. Mean E.D. P-value (diff) Mean E.D. Mean E.D. 
P-value 
(diff) 
Self-employed 
(main) 
.9037 .2951 .0144 .1194 (<0.01) .9096 .2875 .0043 .0659 (<0.01) 
Salaried (main) .0616 .2407 .9652 .1831 (<0.01) .0451 .2083 .9752 .1554 (<0.01) 
Salaried .0827 .2756 1 0 (<0.01) .0564 .2315 1 0 (<0.01) 
Self-employed 1 0 .0530 .2242 (<0.01) 1 0 .0145 .1198 (<0.01) 
Entrepreneur .2496 .4331 .0144 .1194 (<0.01) .3502 .4784 .0072 .0859 (<0.01) 
Self-employment 
earnings 
1029.7 4117.6 46.07 725.7 (<0.01) 412.03 1642.1 1.778 46.62 (<0.01) 
Wage 247.82 1035.8 3029.7 4394.1 (<0.01) 64.11 354.34 1591.6 1227.9 (<0.01) 
Total earnings 1277.5 4246.9 3075.8 4459.6 (<0.01) 476.18 1667.5 1593.4 1227.7 . (<0.01) 
Household 
income 
17430 44847 7906.5 29789 (<0.01) 14867 63919 4576.9 5547.6 (<0.01) 
Household 
expenses 
2433.2 3796.8 1561.2 1269.3 (<0.01) 1884.1 2452.0 1247.0 905.05 (<0.01) 
Home 
Ownership 
.9593 .1975 .9189 .2729 (<0.01) .8983 .3031 .8791 .3261 (0.443) 
Age 55.24 10.99 49.13 10.15 (<0.01) 51.82 10.92 46.70 9.619 (<0.01) 
Age^2/100 31.72 12.14 25.17 9.837 (<0.01) 28.04 11.55 22.73 8.903 (<0.01) 
Family size 3.198 1.334 3.145 1.260 (0.450) 2.915 1.300 2.895 1.236 (0.815) 
Living as a 
couple 
.8330 .3731 .7849 .4110 (<0.01) .6214 .4863 .5254 .4997 (0.020) 
Good health .8090 .3933 .8746 .3312 (<0.01) .8135 .3905 .8602 .3469 (0.113) 
Basic education .1909 .3933 .1494 .3567 (0.054) .1920 .3950 .1382 .3454 (0.068) 
Sec. education .3203 .4669 .4445 .4971 (<0.01) .3898 .4890 .4643 .4990 (0.072) 
Univ. education .4872 .5002 .4011 .4903 (<0.01) .4124 .4936 .3930 .4887 (0.637) 
Age of business  18.75 13.08 - - - 16.44 14.58 - - - 
Experience (p.s.) 1.908 .3890 17.39 12.31 (<0.01) .6610 .2411 12.74 10.89 (<0.01) 
Long-term 
contract 
- - .8833 .2311 - - - .8034 .3976 - 
Full-time 
contract 
- - .9324 .2510 - - - .7423 .4376 - 
Self-employment 
working hours 
43.25 16.82 1.314 6.729 (<0.01) 37.81 19.57 .3595 3.345 (<0.01) 
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Salaried working 
hours 
2.357 8.982 40.13 10.12 (<0.01) 1.276 5.690 34.18 10.63 (<0.01) 
Total working 
hours 
45.61 16.33 41.45 10.53 (<0.01) 39.09 19.40 34.54 10.70 (<0.01) 
Mortgages 10150 50396 4943 10546 (<0.01) 4793.2 10094 4977.9 24089 (0.911) 
Household 
vehicles value 
2714.5 8808.3 1359.6 2189.4 (<0.01) 1437.0 2237.3 906.01 1454.4 (<0.01) 
Household  
estate value 
173703 515277 55884 110650 (<0.01) 94087 166910 41111 126153 (<0.01) 
Other property 
value 
4433.0 20359 1017.2 7474.1 (<0.01) 1437.3 4659.5 505.49 4330.9 (0.011) 
Debts 18113 311605 1620.5 17517 (0.092) 2334.8 12022 525.58 3351.5 (<0.01) 
Assets 79739 2757656 443076 3152419 (0.013) 402989 2132587 68646 292650 (<0.01) 
N. obs. 665 1037  177 687  
Note: the sample (EFF 2011) is restricted to families whose head of Household is a salaried worker or self-
employed. Monetary variables are measured in Euros and temporal variables in hours per week. We show 
in parentheses t-test p-values of the differences between salaried and self-employed workers. 
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Figure 1. Densities of earnings  
 
Note: the sample (EFF 2011) is restricted to salaried and self-employed workers, respectively. Earnings 
are measured in Euros. 
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Figure 2. Relationship between weekly market work time and earnings 
 
 
Note: the sample (EFF 2011) is restricted to salaried and self-employed workers, respectively. Earnings 
are measured in Euros and weekly market work time in hours. 
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Figure 3. Relationships between earnings, education level and market work time 
 
 
Note: the sample (EFF 2011) is restricted to salaried and self-employed workers, respectively. Earnings 
are measured in Euros and weekly market work time in hours. The education level takes the values 1 
(basic education), 2 (secondary education) and 3 (university education).  
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Figure 4. Relationship between earnings and experience  
 
 
Note: the sample (EFF 2011) is restricted to salaried and self-employed workers, respectively. Earnings 
are measured in Euros. Experience is measured in years (for self-employed workers, we take the age of 
the business as a proxy of the self-employed individuals experience).  
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Table 3. Earning models 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Salaried Self-employed Salaried Entrepreneur 
     
Self-employed  -659.456**    
 (305.214)    
Entrepreneur    -462.420  
   (285.932)  
Salaried  1,295.558*** 
(302.154) 
 1,080.694*** 
(494.228) 
Working hours 24.667*** 
(9.267) 
4.709 
(6.818) 
21.980*** 
(8.970) 
-1.818 
(7.067) 
Male 509.114*** -117.346 510.129*** -292.789 
 (70.859) (273.505) (70.993) (461.778) 
Age  12.796 18.160 14.197 32.367 
 (28.650) (37.798) (28.686) (56.857) 
Age^2/100 -18.869 -19.188 -20.426 -33.717 
 (32.552) (33.214) (32.539) (60.782) 
Good health -243.912 94.847 -246.322 176.335 
 (230.074) (125.483) (232.024) (193.775) 
Home ownership -118.408 123.383 -132.682 377.743 
 (199.143) (183.979) (198.144) (285.886) 
Debts 0.006 -0.001 0.006 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001) 
Living as a couple 70.766 -35.461 67.163 -512.774 
 (78.823) (111.840) (78.674) (349.113) 
Family size -149.251*** -20.495 -146.877*** 170.755* 
 (40.186) (81.070) (40.250) (102.359) 
Monthly expenses 746.675*** 660.066** 744.532*** 840.823 
 (143.793) (259.883) (143.131) (619.441) 
Sec. education 157.291* -28.331 158.609* 6.128 
 (89.085) (126.153) (89.088) (202.109) 
Univ. education 1,097.100*** 156.624 1,092.037*** 208.946 
 (141.638) (204.091) (140.146) (273.281) 
Experience (p.s.) 21.059***  20.509***  
 (4.829)  (4.987)  
Full-time contract 205.148  268.145  
 (179.770)  (172.034)  
Long-term contract 257.303***  271.468***  
 (90.179)  (91.742)  
Age of business  5.092  82.614* 
  (8.626) 
 
 (43.878) 
Intercept -760.962 -1,160.756 -741.023 -1,908.313 
 (484.416) (860.462) (483.706) (1,468.911) 
     
Observations 1,724 842 1,724 228 
R-squared 0.415 0.200 0.413 0.264 
 
Note: the dependent variable is “total earnings”. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample (EFF 2011) is restricted to salaried individuals (columns 1, 3), self-
employed workers (column 2) and entrepreneurs (column 4). Monetary variables are measured in Euros 
and temporal variables in hours per week. We control the education level by individuals with basic 
education. 
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Table 4. Self-employment model 
 
 (1) (2) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Probit (1) Probit (2) Logit (1) Logit (2) 
     
Working hours 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.052*** 0.030*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) 
Male 0.181 0.185 0.212 0.185 
 (0.142) (0.142) (0.258) (0.142) 
Age  -0.149** -0.149** -0.176 -0.149** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.109) (0.065) 
Age^2/100 0.207*** 0.209*** 0.264** 0.209*** 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.121) (0.071) 
Good health -0.061 -0.059 0.105 -0.059 
 (0.217) (0.216) (0.392) (0.216) 
Living as a couple 0.039 0.036 0.033 0.036 
 (0.150) (0.149) (0.282) (0.149) 
Family size 0.035 0.033 0.088 0.033 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.118) (0.065) 
Sec. education -0.434** -0.437** -0.789** -0.437** 
 (0.193) (0.196) (0.332) (0.196) 
Univ. education -0.180 -0.187 -0.399 -0.187 
 (0.209) (0.210) (0.369) (0.210) 
Experience (p.s.) -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.379*** -0.149*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.068) (0.020) 
Unemployed in 2010 -0.944*** -0.944*** -1.974*** -0.944*** 
 (0.255) (0.256) (0.544) (0.256) 
Monthly expenses 0.170* 0.169** 0.187 0.169** 
 (0.087) (0.086) (0.193) (0.086) 
Mortgages -0.057  -0.048  
 (0.070)  (0.132)  
Household vehicles value 0.793* 0.809* 1.828* 0.809* 
 (0.468) (0.470) (1.050) (0.470) 
Household estate value 0.044** 0.042** 0.118* 0.042** 
 (0.021) (0.017) (0.067) (0.017) 
Other property value 0.144  0.624  
 (0.431)  (0.800)  
Debts 0.174  0.358  
 (0.131)  (0.415)  
Assets 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Intercept 0.891 0.856 -0.036 0.856 
 (1.417) (1.419) (2.366) (1.419) 
     
Observations 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501 
 
Note: the dependent variable is the dummy variable “self-employed”. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample (EFF 2011) is restricted to families whose head 
of Household is a salaried or a self-employed worker. Monetary variables are measured in Euros and 
temporal values in hours per week. We control the education level by individuals with basic education. 
 
